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MEDICARE PRICE PROBLEMS AND THE RUC: 
WAGGING THE DOG 
“You have to be alert, and the public has to be alert. Cause that is the 
war of the future, and if you’re not gearing up, to fight that war, eventually 
the axe will fall.” — Conrad Brean1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite extensive reform under The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),2 there remains much to be accomplished in terms of 
implementation and regulation of the new law and there are numerous 
unaddressed problems.3 Among the issues lost in the debate of health 
reform is the continued use of the Relative Value Scale Update Committee 
(RUC);4 a committee specifically designed to guide CMS in setting 
reimbursement rates for Medicare.5 While the RUC is not directly 
responsible for setting the reimbursement rates for Medicare, it heavily 
influences the process by which rates are initially set and subsequently 
reviewed. 
However, since the RUC is not a licensed Federal Advisory Committee 
(FAC),6 it is not subject to the advisement standards of other FACs, as 
outlined in the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA).7 Further, 
 
 1. WAG THE DOG (New Line Cinema 1998). 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10202(c)(1)(A), 
124 Stat. 119, 924 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) (2011)) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 3. See, e.g., John Jacobi et al., Implementing Health Reform at the State Level: Access 
and Care for Vulnerable Populations, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 69-70 (2011) (discussing 
potential obstacles in health reform including shortages in primary care physicians in addition 
to issues between eligibility for health insurance versus actual enrollment). 
 4. See Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’ Medicare 
Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values, 
31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 970 (2012) (identifying the relatively few changes made by the ACA to 
CMS’s update process). Section 3134 of the ACA does require that CMS increase data 
collection and analytics. This includes adjusting incorrect values for services most notably 
“services with the fastest growth in utilization, new technology, services billed together, and 
services that have not been reviewed since the payment system was implemented.” Id. 
 5. “RUC” is colloquially pronounced “ruck.” AM. MED. ASS’N., AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY 
RVS UPDATE COMMITTEE REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ 
rbrvs/ruc-is-ruc-is-not.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. App. § 2 (2012)) (noting the term “advisory committee means any 
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CMS’s rate setting methods remain excluded from judicial review due to a 
procedural safeguard,8 leaving no effective remedy to change the outcome 
of misvalued Medicare rates. Here, application of the FACA to the RUC, 
through either legislative or regulatory change, will improve transparency of 
the RUC’s advisement and improve the rate setting process without 
completely overhauling the current system. 
A recent suit brought against HHS and CMS alleged that the RUC 
disproportionately represents specialist physicians and argued that the RUC 
should be subject to review under the FACA.9 On August 8, 2011, six 
primary care physicians filed a complaint against CMS and HHS for 
ostensibly accepting recommendations made by the RUC without review and 
charged that the effects of the RUC’s recommendations have led to a 
significant gap between primary care physicians and specialists.10 
This case encapsulated an ongoing battle of primary care physicians, 
lobbyists, and politicians over the RUC’s vitality and nature.11 One of the 
physicians most essential points is that the exclusivity, privacy, and immunity 
by which the RUC operates when calculating the relative value units (RVU), 
which disproportionately reward specialist physicians over primary care 
physicians, is detrimental to the Medicare fee schedule and should be 
subject to scrutiny under the FACA.12 
The court dismissed the case on the grounds that “Congress has 
precluded courts from reviewing, not only the final relative values and RVUs, 
but also the method by which those values and units are generated.”13 
Previous courts have remarked that this preclusion aids the Secretary to 
make quick and efficient decisions regarding annual evaluations of RVUs,14 
 
committee, board commission, council conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, 
or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof . . ., which is – (A) established by statute or 
reorganization plan, or (B) established or utilized by the President, or (C) established or utilized 
by one or more agencies,” which the RUC does not fit that definition and is therefore not 
subject to advisement standards set forth in the FACA). 
 8. Brian Klepper, Medicare Physician Payment: A Hollow Victory for the RUC, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG (May 18, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2012/05/18/ 
medicare-physician-payment-a-hollow-victory-for-the-ruc/. 
 9. Brian Klepper, A Legal Challenge to CMS’ Reliance on the RUC, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(August 9, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/09/a-legal-chal 
lange-to-cms-reliance-on-the-ruc/. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Complaint at 2-3, Fischer v. Berwick, 2012 WL 1655320 (D. Md. 2012) (No. WMN-
11-2191). 
 13. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *2. See also Klepper, supra note 8. 
 14. Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447, 454 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (discussing congressional intent of this preclusion, which helps the Secretary make 
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but have not commented on the fairness or accuracy of the decisions. 
Further, these courts and the Fischer court have avoided any evaluation or 
discussion of the requirement that federal advisory bodies adhere to the 
FACA.15 
This comment will argue, in spite of the court’s sidestepping, that the 
RUC should in fact be governed by the FACA. First, an examination of the 
RUC and the current Medicare fee schedule will demonstrate the current 
problems and practices exhibited by the RUC. Then, an explication on the 
history of the FACA and its functionality will expound on the importance of 
FACs and the review of those committees’ decisions. Lastly, a comparison of 
the RUC’s practices and the provisions of the FACA will show that the RUC’s 
advising has taken place in the shadows of Medicare payment reform. This 
has helped lead to imbalanced reimbursement for Medicare and private 
payers and effectively incentivizing an entire sector of specialized healthcare. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The U.S. trails other developed nations in health quality and health cost 
efficiency.16 This crisis can be traced in part to the decline of primary care 
and preventative care services,17 which many scholars attribute to the 
adoption of the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS).18 This 
payment system was implemented in 1992, as part of the newly established 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS).19 Following growing concerns 
about the rapid rise in the cost of physician services, Congress enacted the 
MPFS as a part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.20 Prior 
to the implementation of the RBRVS, Medicare physicians had been paid 
based on the Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR) system founded by 
 
quick and efficient decisions regarding RVU adjustments under a budget neutrality 
requirement). 
 15. See generally id. at 447-56 (lacking discussion and analysis on the requirement that 
federal advisory bodies adhere to the FACA). See also Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1-6. 
 16. Lewis G. Sandy et al., The Political Economy of U.S. Primary Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 
1136, 1136 (2009). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Paul B. Ginsberg, Rapidly Evolving Physician-Payment Policy – More than 
the SGR, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 172, 173 (2011); John D. Goodson, Unintended 
Consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308, 
2308 (2007). 
 19. Stephanie Maxwell & Stephen Zuckerman, Impact of Resource-Based Practice 
Expenses on the Medicare Physician Volume, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., no. 2, 2007-08 at 
65, 65. 
 20. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 789-90 (6th ed. 
2008). 
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Blue Shield in the 1950s.21 This allowed for great fluctuations between 
communities and eventually led to physicians setting their own rates of 
reimbursement, which became a significant cost problem after the 
enactment of Medicare.22 However, with the advent of the RBRVS, Congress 
hoped to address these issues by using variable rates.23 
In theory, this new practice made significantly more sense. It had less 
discretionary input and adjusted for a number of different particular variants. 
The new MPFS corrected distortions from the previous charge-based 
payment system and was intended to encourage efficiencies in medical 
practice.24 The MPFS was believed to be the solution to other problems as 
well, such as the growing discrepancy between payments for evaluation and 
management services and payments for technical service procedures, as 
well as unexplainable cost variations arising in rural areas.25 The result of 
these distortions is believed to have “discouraged physicians from practicing 
in primary care specialties and in rural areas.”26 It is believed that these 
distortions also encouraged a “procedurally oriented style of care.”27 
Unfortunately, the system now suffers from myriad new problems and the 
accurate valuation for practice expenses has gotten worse.28 
Under the new MPFS, the Secretary of CMS was charged with 
developing a methodology for calculating valuations,29 which eventually 
resulted in the utilization of the RBRVS when the Secretary engaged a section 
of the statute allowing extrapolation and “other techniques” to determine 
these values.30 These values are known as relative value units, or RVUs, and 
became the basis for all payments in the MPFS.31 
 
 21. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 614 (2nd ed. 
2012). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Paul B. Ginsberg & Robert Berenson, Revising Medicare’s Physician Fee Schedule 
– Much Activity, Little Change, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1201, 1201 (2007). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ginsberg & Berenson, supra note 23, at 1202. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(A)(i) (2011). 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(A)(ii). The system was designed through Harvard studies, 
but did not originally include estimates for practice expense RVUs, so the RBRVS practice 
expenses were based upon historical physician charges until 1999. At this time, CMS began 
phasing in resource-based practice expense RVUs by relying on “estimates of service-specific, 
direct expenses, pricing data, and specialty-specific, practice-level expenses.” Laura A. 
Dummit, Medicare Physician Fees: The Data Behind the Numbers, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, 
July 22, 2010, at 7. 
 31. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790 (discussing the physician fee 
schedule and the method for calculating payments using RVUs). 
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As the fundamental unit of measure for the MPFS, and the basis for 
each payment calculation, the RVU component is actually three separate 
cost components, or three separate RVUs: (1) physician work (PW); (2) 
practice expenses (PE); and (3) malpractice insurance (MP).32 The PW 
component is the most complex. It must account for four categories of input: 
time, mental effort and judgment, technical skill, and psychological stress33 
(or the “time and intensity” involved in providing a medical service).34 
It is estimated that the work component accounts for 50% of the total 
payment per service.35 The PE component is a reflection of the necessary 
equipment and resources used in providing a specific medical service.36 This 
can include anything from renting office space, to equipment purchases, to 
staff costs.37 Different PE RVUs can be applied depending on where the 
services are delivered (e.g., at a doctor’s office, ambulatory surgery center, 
or hospital).38 The final RVU component, MP, is based upon the malpractice 
insurance required for the physician rendering the service.39 
RBRVS payment rates are founded on three different components: a 
weighted value, which is the RVU, prescribed to a specific medical 
procedure, a geographical adjuster, and a conversion factor.40 The other 
two adjusters — the conversion factor (CF) and the Geographical Practice 
Cost Index (GPCI) — are significant factors in adjusting costs to account for 
medical inflation and the differences in costs to practice around the country, 
respectively.41 Each component is then adjusted to account for area price 
differences under the GPCI before the three components are summed and 
multiplied by the conversion factor to arrive at an appropriate 
reimbursement per service rendered.42 
 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4(c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (2011). See also Maxwell & 
Zuckerman, supra note 19. 
 33. See William C. Hsiao et al., Estimating Physicians’ Work for a Resource-Based 
Relative-Value Scale, 319 N. ENG. J. MED. 835, 836 (1988); AM. MED. ASS’N., RVS UPDATE 
PROCESS (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/ruc-update-
booklet.pdf; and MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PROMOTING 
GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 236 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
jun07_EntireReport.pdf. 
 34. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PHYSICIAN FEE SCHEDULE: PAYMENT 
SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 3 (2011) [hereinafter MPFS FACT SHEET]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2011). See also MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 
34, at 2. 
 42. MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3. 
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The output of this equation is then assigned an identifying number under 
CMS’s Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) and the American 
Medical Association’s (AMA) Common Procedural Terminology (CPT).43 
Essentially, to determine a single billing amount for a given medical service, 
there are three separate RVUs, each of which is multiplied by a separate and 
distinct GPCI.44 These three totals are then added together and multiplied 
by the conversion factor so that the formula for MPFS payment rates ends up 
looking like this: [(PW RVU x PW GPCI) + (PE RVU x PE GPCI) + (MP RVU x 
MP GPCI)] x CF = payment amount.45 However, in recent years, the 
conversion factor has not been applied.46 
The conversion factor is updated annually and based upon a 
comparison of the actual inflation of medical costs, as measured by the 
Medicare Economic Index (MEI), and the target rate for medical 
expenditures, as established by the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).47 
According to CMS, the SGR is based on a combination of “medical 
inflation, the projected growth in the domestic economy, projected growth of 
[Medicare] beneficiaries . . . and changes in law or regulation.”48 However, 
as Paul Ginsberg points out, this policy is frustrating to both physicians and 
policy makers, and it has not been enforced since 2003.49 As medical 
expenses have continued to rise unchecked by the SGR, rates now exceed 
the SGR by nearly 25%.50 Despite the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 
estimates that the annual override could cost the government nearly $330 
billion in unanticipated costs by 2020,51 the payment reform is regarded as 
the more appropriate method to improve rising costs and poor quality in 
healthcare.52 
 
 43. The CPT is the charge a provider would designate for a performed service when 
applying for Medicare reimbursement. See AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 4. See 
also FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 790. 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2011). 
 45. Id. See also MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3. 
 46. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172. 
 47. MPFS FACT SHEET, supra note 34, at 3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172. Ginsberg explains that “budget legislation in 1997 
created the more stringent SGR formula, which allowed smaller utilization increases and tied 
the formula to the ups and downs of the broader economy. The SGR resulted in annual 
updates to the fee schedule at or above the Medicare Economic Index until 2002, when a 
4.8% reduction occurred, setting the stage for Congress to repeatedly block subsequent sharp 
rate reductions. When the SGR formula called for another large decrease in rates in 2003, 
Congress blocked the cut.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 176. 
 51. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF CHANGES IN NET FEDERAL OUTLAYS FROM 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGING PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES IN MEDICARE 2 (2010). 
 52. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 176. 
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In addition to establishing the MPFS, the Secretary of HHS is also 
charged with periodic review and adjustment of the values.53 According to 
the statute, the Secretary is required to review all values no less than every 
five years and make any needed adjustments.54 In addition to this five-year 
review process, CMS annually evaluates new services and makes 
adjustments to the values of existing services.55 This process can be quite 
extensive as there are over 7,600 CPT codes with corresponding RVUs.56 In 
order to cope with this large demand, CMS began relying on outside 
recommendations almost immediately, mainly from the AMA’s RUC.57 
Established in tandem with the RBRVS, the RUC is a formation of the AMA 
that was created to provide annual recommendations to CMS regarding 
changes to the RBRVS values.58 To assist in its recommendations, the RUC 
sends out as many as 1,000 physician surveys, but only requires 30 
responses in order to value a physician service.59 
Further, the original membership of the RUC in 1991 was designed “to 
include all major specialties, primarily defined as the 24 Member Boards of 
the American Board of Medical Specialties.”60 Future seats on the RUC have 
been determined by the following criteria: 
1. The specialty is an American Board of Medical Specialties specialty. 
2. The specialty comprises 1% of physicians in practice. 
3. The specialty comprises 1% of physician Medicare expenditures. 
4. Medicare revenue is at least 10% of mean practice revenue for the 
specialty. 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B) (2011). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B)(i) (2011). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (2011) (discussing the Secretary’s discretion to 
assign values to new services and adjust rankings of existing services). 
 56. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 
77 Fed. Reg. 68896 (Nov. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 410, 414, 415, 421, 
423, 425, 486, and 495). 
 57. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5. 
 58. T. Reginald Harris, MD, Chairman, Am. Med. Ass’n, Physicians’ Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT), Statement before the Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards, 
and Security, National Committee on Vital Health Statistics, Department of Health and Human 
Services (April 16, 1997), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/97041614.htm [hereinafter 
Harris Testimony]. 
 59. Carlos J. Lavernia & Brian Parsley, Medicare Reimbursement: An Orthopedic Primer, 
21 J. ARTHROPLASTY (SUPP. 2) 6, 7 (2006). See also AM. MED. ASS’N. supra note 33 (“The 
societies are required to survey at least 30 practicing physicians.”). 
 60. AM. MED. ASS’N. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT 14 OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES (A-08) 
THE RUC: RECENT ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE VALUATION OF PRIMARY CARE SERVICES, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/rucbotreport.pdf. 
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5. The specialty is not meaningfully represented by an umbrella 
organization, as determined by the RUC.61 
The AMA maintains that the RUC is “an independent group exercising its 
First Amendment Right to petition the federal government” and explicitly 
states that the RUC is not “an advisory committee to CMS.”62 However, 
since its inception, it has appeared to function in exactly that capacity,63 and 
has come under intense criticism in recent years for the vast discrepancy 
between the pay for specialist services and that for primary care services.64 
Kerry Weems, former CMS administrator, believes that the institutional 
presence of the RUC has helped lead to the poor state of primary care in 
the U.S.;65 the exact problem for which the new MPFS was created to 
avoid.66 Weems describes CMS as an agency that struggles with resource 
and staffing constraints directly affecting health reform.67 Among these 
problems is the reliance on the RUC. 
The intent behind creating the RUC may have been to delegate power to 
an independent body to inject its expertise into the RBRVS payment system;68 
however, it appears that CMS has entrusted too much responsibility to the 
RUC.69 Weems describes the RBRVS as an “input measurement system,” 
which relies heavily on the cost of inputs and the effect of that cost on the 
pricing of outputs.70 Because the assessment process “delineates and 
quantifies a service’s inputs in terms of its Relative Value Units which, with a 
monetary multiplier, define its worth,”71 this process can easily result in 
misvalued services. This can quickly escalate costs and pricing, thus ruining 
the reliability and sustainability of the Medicare reimbursement system. 
In effect, the RBRVS is a microcosm of the fee-for-service issue in 
Medicare payment. Except with the RBRVS, the potential abuse is not 
unnecessarily escalating volume, but unnecessarily adjusting cost for 
preferred services. For example, one study considers evidence of errors in 
 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5. 
 63. See Infra Part IV. 
 64. John K. Inglehart, Doing More with Less: A Conversation with Kerry Weems, 28 
HEALTH AFF. w688, w695 (2009). 
 65. Id. at w695. 
 66. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 173. 
 67. Inglehart, supra note 64, at w688. 
 68. See AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5. 
 69. Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: The 
Promise and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 75, 107 
(2012). 
 70. Inglehart, supra note 64, at w695. 
 71. Brian Klepper & David Kibbe, Rethinking the Value of Medical Services, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (August 1, 2011, 2:08 PM), http://www.heatthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/01/rethinking-
the-value-of-medical-services/. 
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Medicare’s prices for hospital care and physician services and discusses 
ways to improve the accuracy of those prices and identifies the need to 
conduct data analyses in consultation with the RUC.72 These analyses would 
identify services that have experienced substantial changes in volume, site of 
service, and other factors that may indicate changes in resource 
requirements.73 
The author’s particular study found that in cardiovascular services with 
high rates of volume growth, the work component of that RVU stayed 
relatively constant over a 12-year period, despite the inclination that 
cardiologists became more adept at performing these procedures.74 
According to the authors of this study, the RUC does little to account for 
overvalued RVUs as exemplified in the above instance.75 While CMS 
accounts for changes to RVUs during a five-year periodic review, seldom are 
overvalued services identified.76 In fact, numerous studies have concluded 
that specialty work value units are inflated across the board and that many 
of these RVUs should be reduced as a reflection of productivity gains within 
that particular specialty practice.77 
Another example of skewed RVU assessment describes the rapid growth 
of imaging services and recent changes in how Medicare reimburses for 
these services.78 The authors of the study claim that certain imaging services 
may still be overvalued by CMS, thus inflating Medicare spending, again 
due to the RUC’s improper RVU valuation.79 Among the solutions offered by 
the authors was a suggestion that the RUC review values to ensure that their 
“time estimates reflect advances in technology . . . .”80 These two studies 
offer similar conclusions about inflated physician work values as part of a 
larger trend in Medicare spending: RVUs are often overvalued for specialty 
 
 72. Kevin J. Hayes et al., Getting the Price Right: Medicare Payment Rates or 
Cardiovascular Service, 26 HEALTH AFF. 124, 131 (2007). 
 73. Id. at 135. 
 74. Id. at 133. 
 75. Id. 
 76. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 87 (Mar. 2010). 
 77. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618 (citing MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY 
COMM’N, supra note 76, at 87); Jerry Cromwell et al., Missing Productivity Gains in the 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule: Where Are They?, 67 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 676, 678 
(2010); and Thomas Bodenheimer et al., The Primary Care-Specialty Income Gap: Why It 
Matters, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 301, 305 (2007). 
 78. Ariel Winter & Nancy Ray, Paying Accurately for Imaging Services in Medicare, 27 
HEALTH AFF. 1479, 1479 (2008). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1488. 
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care and undervalued for primary care physician services.81 The growing 
difference in reimbursement rates under the MPFS between specialists and 
primary care physicians has become known as the physician payment gap, 
and has provided plenty of fodder for critics of the RUC, most of who call 
for drastic overhaul of the RBRVS system.82 The physician payment gap is 
believed to have led to a number of other complications within the field of 
primary care and the healthcare industry as a whole;83 yet, it goes unsolved. 
The American public likely has little sympathy for a primary care 
physician who complains about payment discrepancies because incomes of 
the physicians are wildly higher than that of the average American. But this 
discrepancy in pay is a prime reason that U.S. medical students turn to 
specialty careers over primary care.84 The discrepancy is only aggravated by 
private insurance.85 In fact, the primary care-specialty fee gap is actually 
larger for private plans than for Medicare,86 which demonstrates that many 
of the principles of Medicare payment reform are incorporated in the 
systems of private insurers and Medicaid programs,87 and emphasizes the 
leverage of Medicare in price-setting. 
 
 81. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618. Other examples include comparing a 
“moderately complex primary care office visit” for an established patient with “an 
ophthalmologist’s 10-15 minute cataract extraction and implantation of an intra-ocular lens.” 
Klepper & Kibbe, supra note 71. The comparative ratio for the value of these two services is 
greater than 1:7, respectively. Id. In 2011, Medicare paid $111.36 for the primary care 
physician visit and a total of $836.36 for the visit to the ophthalmologist. Id. Further, 
“[c]ataract removal, a 50 year old procedure that has been highly refined and automated, 
immediately improves sight, a dramatic impact. Many ophthalmologists operate ‘focused 
factories,’ processing an assembly line of 20 or more cataract patients. With pre-screened 
patients and a controlled clinical environment, the risks are relatively predictable, the mental 
demands limited and the work repetitive.” Id. 
 82. ROBERT GRAHAM CTR., SPECIALTY AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE PHYSICIAN 
WORKFORCE: WHAT INFLUENCES MEDICAL STUDENT AND RESIDENT CHOICES? 2, 32 (2009). See, 
e.g., Allan H. Goroll, Reforming Physician Payment, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2087, 2090 
(2008) (“Viewing the current fee-for-service system, its institutional mechanisms, and proposed 
modifications as structurally flawed, clinically questionable, and inadequate for the delivery of 
robust primary care [Goroll] propose[s] fundamental reform of payment for primary care, 
replacing volume-based payment with risk adjusted comprehensive payment for the delivery of 
comprehensive primary care.”). 
 83. Dummit, supra note 30, at 14. According to Dummit, the MPFS has been cited as the 
cause of numerous problems, including: “physician specialty imbalances, overuse of certain 
well-paid services and underuse of poorly paid services, and physician payment inequities. Yet 
even with such high stakes, ensuring the accuracy of the fee schedule continues to rely on 
limited data.” Id. 
 84. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 77, at 301. 
 85. Id. at 304. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 172. 
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In 2006, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)88 first 
addressed the leading causes of this discrepancy in its report to Congress on 
Medicare Payment Policy.89 Included in MedPAC’s analysis were the 
following factors: 1) the dominance of the RUC by specialists; 2) a majority 
of review requests came from specialist societies; 3) a majority of the reviews 
were for undervalued services; 4) the adjustments must be budget neutral; 
and 5) “CMS generally accepts the RUC’s recommendations.”90 MedPAC’s 
analysis is essentially a blueprint for most arguments against the RUC’s 
current influence on Medicare payment and a starting point for future cost 
control measures. 
MedPAC’s recommendations for the RUC have not yet been heeded by 
Congress to any effective degree, although past evidence suggests that in 
order to reach creative solutions for Medicare pricing reform certain vitals 
are required,91 including “divid[ing] industry groups by buying them off (at 
least, a sufficient bloc of them) to reduce their opposition to difficult 
payment reforms.”92 This was effectively done during the implementation of 
the RBRVS. However, despite the RBRVS being designed “to lessen the fee 
disparity between office visits — the bread and butter of primary care — 
and procedures provided by specialists,”93 the payment gap widened 
because the AMA allowed the RUC to be composed mostly of members 
named to specialist societies, thus by “buying off” medical specialty groups, 
the societies undermined the intent of the arrangement.94 
CMS finally acknowledged the issue of overvalued codes, as discussed 
in the MPFS rules for 2009 and 2010.95 Efforts are now on course to 
 
 88. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 76. MedPAC, an independent 
congressional agency, advises Congress on Medicare payment issues. It was originally 
established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33. Id. This includes health 
plans participating in Medicare Advantage and providers operating through Medicare’s FFS 
program. Id. In addition to advising the Congress on payments to health plans participating in 
the Medicare Advantage program and providers in Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service 
program, other responsibilities of MedPAC include analyzing access to care and quality of 
care. Id. 
 89. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 133-35 (2006), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar06entire 
Report.pdf. 
 90. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 618. 
 91. Robert F. Coulam et al., Competitive Pricing and the Challenge of Cost Control in 
Medicare, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 649, 650, 666-67 (2011) (aiming to develop prudent 
purchasing through competitive pricing and examining Medicare price policy). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 77, at 301. 
 94. Coulam et al., supra note 91, at 667 n.23. 
 95. See Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
69881 (Nov. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 409-15, 423-24, 485-86, 
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update the RBRVS, although this likely has little to do with revising the RUC, 
but rather increasing review of potentially overvalued CPT codes.96 
Additionally, efforts were recently included in the ACA to improve 
overvalued codes.97 This is certainly a step in the right direction, however, 
any creative approach to Medicare payment reform is likely to be thwarted 
by the interest groups that are already financially well-endowed under the 
current process.98 
Other scholars have positioned themselves against the practice of the 
RUC, claiming that the medical profession needs a drastic overhaul of the 
current infrastructure governing the valuation of clinical services and 
practice expenses, increased transparency, and increased input from experts 
“who have the health of individuals, the nation, and the economy as their 
highest priorities.”99 It is this desire for accountability that is driving the focus 
of this argument. The RUC, as currently structured, is private and exclusive, 
a grave concern for a committee so heavily involved in setting the MPFS. 
Operating in such a capacity without adequate review has so far been 
detrimental to the reimbursement for primary care physicians. While CMS 
has recently expressed a need to review values for primary care values 
under the RBRVS,100 a step further would be to subject the RUC to the review 
standards by which every FAC abides. 
 
489); Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 74 Fed. Reg. 61775 
(Nov. 25, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410-15, 485, 498). 
 96. Paul B. Ginsburg, Rapidly Evolving Physician-Payment Policy – More Than the SGR, 
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 172, 174 (2011). 
 97. See Refinements to the RVUs, 76 Fed. Reg. 73034 (Nov. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 414, 415, et al.); ACA § 3134(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
4(c)(2)(K)(ii) (2011)) (identifying several categories of potentially misvalued codes for review, 
including: codes for new technologies or services; frequently billed codes associated with a 
single service, common codes with low relative values; and codes that have not been reviewed 
since the inception of the RBRVS). 
 98. See Peter V. Lee & David Lansky, Making Space for Disruption: Putting Patients at the 
Center of Health Care, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1345, 1346 (2008) (examining the effect of regulation 
and legislation on cost-effective care). Lee and Lansky call out the RUC for its high consistency 
of procedural specialists and for containing “not one patient, purchaser, or payer” on the 
committee. Id. 
 99. John D. Goodson, Unintended Consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale 
Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308, 2310 (2007). See also Laurence F. McMahon Jr. & Vineet 
Chopra, Health Care Cost and Value: The Way Forward, 307 JAMA 671, 671-72 (2012) 
(outlining the existing approaches to controlling health care costs: 1) a cost-centric approach 
and 2) value-centric approach). The U.S. can no longer afford to allow its health priorities to 
be determined solely on cost or value basis alone. Instead, the medical market should reflect 
clinical values for procedures which have already been analyzed and market those services 
according to their clinical value. Id. at 672. 
 100. Potentially Misvalued Services Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
69881; 74 Fed. Reg. at 61775. See also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO 
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III.  FISCHER V. BERWICK 
On August 8, 2011, six primary care physicians filed suit against CMS 
and HHS for accepting recommendations by the RUC without due 
consideration.101 The physicians charged that the effects of the RUCs 
recommendations contributed to a significant payment gap between primary 
care physicians and specialists.102 The complaint directly challenged CMS’s 
failure to comply with the FACA, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the 
ACA, the Mandamus Act, the Delegation Clause of the United States 
Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.103 
More plainly, the physicians charged that CMS was in violation of the 
APA and FACA for “utilizing the [RUC] as an uncharted and unofficial 
Federal Advisory Committee . . . in that CMS directly manages, utilizes, and 
relies upon the AMA RUC in the relative valuation process that forms the 
basis of the [MPFS].”104 In their request for relief, the physicians requested 
declaratory judgment that CMS had violated the FACA by “failing to allow 
public petitioning of the AMA RUC, failing to provide public access to 
records of the AMA RUC meetings, and failing to ensure that the AMA RUC 
is constituted of members that have a balanced representation of views.”105 
The suit thrust the previously anonymous RUC into the political spotlight, 
which prompted a coordinated defense campaign from the “RUC, the AMA, 
and 47 medical specialty societies.”106 
 
THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 90 (2012), available at http://medpac.gov/docu 
ments/Mar12_EntireRe port.pdf. 
 101. Complaint, supra note 12, at 2-3. See also Klepper, supra note 9; Six Primary Care 
Physicians Sue CMS, Claim Doc Payment System Favors Specialists, BLOOMBERG BNA 1 
(August 12, 2011), http://www.bna.com/six-primary-care-n12884903037/. 
 102. Complaint, supra note 12, at 48. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. at 2-3. 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. Klepper, supra note 9. Compare Joel Klepper, A Letter from America’s Medical 
Specialty Societies to Rep. McDermott (D-WA), CARE & COST (April 8, 2011), http://care 
andcost.com/2011/04/08/a-letter-from-americas-medical-specialty-societies-to-rep-mcder 
mott-d-wa/ (in response to his remarks before the House Ways & Means Committee, and to 
legislation he recently introduced, H.R. 1256), with Barbara Levy, The RUC - Providing 
Valuable Expertise to the Medicare Program for Twenty Years, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (March 28, 
2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2011/March/032811levy.aspx (Chair of 
the AMA/ Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee defending the RUC and its 
value), and Letter from Michael D. Maves, Executive V.P., Am. Med. Ass’n., to Rep. Jim 
McDermott (D-WA) (April 5, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://careandcost.files. 
wordpress.com/2011/04/maves-ama-mcdermott-ltr-40511.pdf (in response to his remarks 
before the House Ways & Means Committee, and to legislation he recently introduced, H.R. 
1256). 
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This challenge brought unprecedented attention to the RUC.107 It 
prompted Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) to introduce a bill,108 the 
Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011, 
which aims “to require the use of analytic contractors in identifying and 
analyzing misvalued physician services under the Medicare physician fee 
schedule and an annual review of potentially misvalued codes under that 
fee schedule.”109 In other words, the bill demanded that CMS replace, or at 
least supplement, the RUC with a neutral third-party analysis when 
determining reimbursement rates.110 However, this total overhaul may not 
be necessary to ensure a more public process. 
Representative McDermott, a long-time critic of the RUC, called for 
sanctioning of the RUC as a FAC, thus subjecting it to transparency and 
accountability,111 claiming that no group influences price setting more in 
healthcare, and that the RUC is more of a concern to long-term 
sustainability of Medicare than the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).112 
McDermott goes on to challenge that CMS’s job is to set rates “in the public 
interest and not in the interest of powerful physician specialties,” claiming 
that increased transparency would not only provide for fairer decisions, but it 
would also benefit “the health of Americans as well as our federal 
budget.”113 
The RUC and its influence is more recognized now than it has been 
since its inception, but its process and rationale still remain secret. The 
physician suit in Fischer v. Berwick aimed to change that, but regrettably it 
was unsuccessful.114 Fischer hinged on a plain accusation, that in its 
delegated power to create and evaluate RVUs for the MPFS, “CMS has 
relied heavily upon the AMA RUC, to the extent that the AMA RUC now has 
become a de facto Federal Advisory Committee and therefore must be 
regulated according to the FACA.”115 For remedy, the physicians sought for 
the RUC to be governed by the FACA and realigned as a FAC, as opposed 
 
 107. Klepper, supra note 9. 
 108. Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011, H.R. 1256, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Press Release, Congressman Jim McDermott, McDermott’s Statement on CMS 
Lawsuit, (Aug. 8, 2011), http://mcdermott.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=510:mcdermotts-statement-on-cms-lawsuit&catid=25:press-releases&Itemid=20. 
 111. Jim McDermott, Harnessing Our Opportunity to Make Primary Care Sustainable, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 395, 396 (2011). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Press Release, Congressman Jim McDermott, supra note 110. 
 114. Fischer v. Berwick, No. WMN-11-2191, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1 (D. Md. May 9, 
2012). 
 115. Complaint, supra note 12, at 11. 
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to operating as a private body petitioning CMS. Despite the favorable fact 
scenario, the court was precluded from adjudicating the issue and dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ action.116 
In a Memorandum to the Opinion, the court discussed why it decided to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ action.117 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ 
action on grounds that judicial review of the Secretary’s determinations is 
barred under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
4(i)(1)(B).118 The court agreed stating that Congress has precluded courts 
from reviewing the final relative values and RVUs and also the method by 
which those values and units were generated.119 
Plaintiffs’ claims implicated part of the actual determinations of RVUs 
and fell within the bar of § 1395w-4(i)(1). The statute, entitled “Restriction 
on Administrative and Judicial Review,” plainly states: 
There shall be no administrative or judicial review under section 1395ff of 
this title or otherwise of –– (A) the determination of the adjusted historical 
payment basis . . . (B) the determination of relative values and relative value 
units . . . including adjustments . . . and (E) the establishment of the system 
for the coding of physicians’ services . . . .”120 
While the court assumed the factual validity of the plaintiffs’ argument,121 it 
determined among the defendant’s many arguments that it was correct in 
asserting that the plaintiffs could not bring judicial review that is otherwise 
barred.122 The court held: 
Accepting as true that RUC plays a major role in the formation of the PFS 
and also accepting as true that this role unfairly skews the PFS toward 
certain medical professions and procedures, the Court, nonetheless, finds 
that Congress has precluded courts from reviewing, not only the final 
relative values and RVUs, but also the method by which those values and 
units are generated.123 
The court spends a majority of its opinion discussing the bar on judicial 
review, its comprehensiveness, and the statutory interpretation of the bar in 
previous suits.124 While the court spends a small portion of its opinion on 
 
 116. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 13951-4(i)(1) (2012). 
 121. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at *3-5 (reviewing Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 
279 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 2002); Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists v. Shalala, 90 F.Supp.2d. 973 
(N.D. Ill. 2000); and Am. Coll. of Cardiology v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 09–62034, 2010 WL 
9463882 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2010)). 
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the applicability of the Due Process Clause, it allocates none of the opinion 
to discussing whether or not the RUC ought to be subjected to the FACA. 
As Brian Klepper explains, the court was confronted by two conflicting 
federal laws.125 The first, as established by Congress, operates as a 
prohibition on the courts and bars the current valuation of Medicare 
payments from judicial review.126 The second, the FACA, requires that 
groups advising the federal government abide by a set of regulated 
transparency standards, including public hearing and notice of meetings,127 
which is not required of the RUC. By focusing solely on the issue of 
judiciability, the court was able to avoid any substantive discussions 
regarding the RUC and the FACA.128 The following section of this note will 
elaborate on the history and applicability of the FACA and discuss whether it 
can be applied to the RUC. 
IV.  FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT OF 1972 
The FACA was passed as a response to the rapid growth of FACs, for 
which there were no previous standards of cost or accountability.129 By 
passing the FACA, Congress aimed to make advisory committees more 
“accountable, transparent, balanced, and independent from influence of 
special interests.”130 A product of the “good-government” phase of the 
early-1970s, the FACA was intentioned to keep Congress and the public 
educated about “the number, purpose, membership, and activities” of any 
group which offered advice or recommendation to the federal 
government.131 Further, the FACA was passed in order to address the exact 
concern that the RUC’s specialist-heavy panel exemplifies: a “concern that 
some interests had come to enjoy uncheck[ed] and perhaps illicit access to 
federal executive decisionmakers.”132 
Unfortunately, the implementation of the FACA has not always achieved 
these goals, and a study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
determined that appointments to some FACs133 were made based on 
ideology of the appointer and not based upon experience, nor were the 
 
 125. Klepper, supra note 8. 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1)(B) (2011). 
 127. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(4)-(5) (2011). 
 128. Klepper, supra note 8. 
 129. Examining the Federal Advisory Committee Act – Current Issues and Developments: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives of the. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Examining the FACA]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good 
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 452 (1997). 
 132. Id. at 453. 
 133. The GAO did not disclose the specific FACs in question. 
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appointees screened for conflicts of interests.134 Especially in the case of 
sensitive and controversial issues, it is the goal of the FACA to ensure that 
the federal government has the assistance of a plethora of assessments, but 
the FACA sometimes falls short of this goal, which is why in 2008, the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform sought to examine 
and amend the FACA.135 
This is not to say that the accountability issues are pervasive throughout 
FACs, or that the RUC is somehow better off not abiding by a broken 
system. Instead, it should be seen as a testament to the resolve of Congress 
to hold FACs accountable to the public and confirm the intentions of the 
FACA to dissolve special interests from controlling Washington.136 
While the RUC has never been sanctioned under the FACA as a FAC, it 
is not any less influential.137 In the context of the possible 2008 amendments 
to the FACA, the GAO spoke out in favor of the greater accountability for 
federal advisory opinions: 
Federal advisory committees have been called the ‘fifth arm of government’ 
because of the significant role they play in advising federal agencies, the 
Congress, and the President on important national issues. To be effective, 
advisory committees must be –– and, just as importantly, be perceived as 
being –– independent and balanced as a whole. As we reported in 2004, 
controversies regarding the federal advisory committee system have 
included concerns that some appointments have been based on ideology 
rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one group of stakeholders 
over others.138 
 
 134. See also Examining the FACA, supra note 129, at 2. 
 135. Id. at 1, 3. See also Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2008, H.R. 
5687, 110th Cong. (2008). While the bill passed the House, it died in the Senate but has 
been reintroduced several times: H.R. 1320, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Mar 05, 2009); 
H.R. 3124, 112th Cong. (as introduced, Oct 06, 2011). As of this publication the bill has not 
yet become law. 
 136. Examining the FACA, supra at 129, at 1. Examples of FACs include the U.S. Military 
Academy Board of Visitors or The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Public Advisory Committee Charter. 
The Department of Commerce alone contains upwards of 60 FACs. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, available at http://webcache.googleusercontent. 
com/search?q=cache:http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/faca.html. 
 137. Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’ Medicare Fees, 
CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 965, 968 (2012) (finding that “CMS accepted 2,419 (87.4 percent) of the 2,768 
work values proposed by the update committee”). 
 138. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of 
Advisory Committees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Robin 
M. Nazzaro, Director, National Resources and Enviornment, Government Accountability 
Office) (emphasis added). 
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Other specifications for agencies operating FACs include: prior 
announcement of committee meetings, notice to interested parties about 
attendance, that meetings be open to the public, and that meeting minutes 
are publically available.139 Of course, none of the well-intentioned 
amendments or current regulations under the FACA even apply to the RUC, 
unless it can be established as a FAC. 
According to the GAO, it is the responsibility of the General Services 
Administration (GSA) to prescribe administrative guidelines and 
management controls for all advisory committees.140 However, the GSA 
cannot approve or deny any agency decision to create a FAC or any actions 
regarding the management of that committee,141 and that is an issue for 
judicial review.142 
In the case of the RUC, because it was not created or initialized by CMS, 
it may have escaped the regulation guidelines established by the GSA and 
the FACA.143 However, according to the guidelines of the FACA,144 and 
certainly in the opinion of the physicians in Fischer,145 the fact that the RUC 
was established by the AMA and not by CMS146 is irrelevant. 
The FACA states that a FAC is “any committee, board, commission, 
council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group [that is] . . . 
established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining 
advice or recommendations for . . . one or more agencies or officers of the 
Federal Government . . . .”147 This phrase alone should be the requisite 
means to enforce the FACA against the RUC, but it may not be that simple. 
According to a statutory interpretation by the Court in Public Citizen v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “the word ‘utilize’ . . . was not to be taken literally, but 
rather was properly understood as an extension and qualification of the term 
 
 139. Id. at 13. 
 140. Federal Advisory Committee Act Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of 
Advisory Committees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (statement of Robert 
Flaak, Director, Committee Management Secretariat, U.S. General Service Administration). 
 141. Id. at 14. 
 142. See Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 513-14 (discussing judicial review of FACA 
claims and enforceability of the courts upon successful prosecution). 
 143. Harris Testimony, supra note 58. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5 
(explaining that the RUC is supported by the AMA and does advise the CMS). 
 144. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(C) (2012). 
 145. Complaint, supra note 12, at 12. 
 146. Harris Testimony, supra note 58. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 5 
(explaining that the RUC is supported by the AMA and does advise the CMS). 
 147. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(C) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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‘establish.’”148 Accordingly, the Court in Public Citizen looked into the 
legislative history of the FACA and found: 
The phrase ‘or utilized’ therefore appears to have been added simply to 
clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees established by the Federal 
Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing groups formed 
indirectly by quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of 
Sciences ‘for’ public agencies as well as ‘by’ such agencies themselves. 
Read in this way, the term ‘utilized’ would meet the concerns of the 
authors . . . that advisory committees . . . ‘utilized by a department or 
agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory 
committee’ . . . would be subject to FACA’s requirements.149 
It is not surprising that given the above interpretation,150 and the subsequent 
disagreement,151 that the most commonly litigated issue under the FACA 
pertains to the process and determination by which a given group becomes 
subject to the regulations under the FACA.152 Given the Court’s holding in 
Public Citizen, it could be discerned that the RUC would not qualify at all 
under the FACA, since while it is utilized by CMS in its determination of 
RVUs, it was not “directly established” by or for CMS.153 
V.  FISCHER V. BERWICK REVISITED 
Regardless of the deterrents of previous decisions and the confusing 
statutory language of the FACA, the physicians in Fischer challenged the 
RUC on several provisions within the FACA,154 including membership,155 
recommendations,156 public access,157 availability of committee records,158 
 
 148. Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 469 (interpreting the majority opinion in Public 
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-53 (1989)). Additionally, Croley and Funk 
point out “the Conference Report, which actually added the words ‘or utilized’ to the bill-
without explaining the reason for the addition-stated generally that the bill did not apply to 
‘advisory committees not directly established by or for [federal] agencies.’” Croley & Funk, 
supra note 131, at 478 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-1403, at 10 (1972)). 
 149. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462-63. 
 150. Id. at 452. The court further stated, “‘[u]tilize’ is a woolly verb, its contours left 
undefined by the statute itself. Read unqualifiedly, it would extend FACA’s requirements to any 
group of two or more persons, or at least any formal organization, from which the President or 
an executive agency seeks advice. We are convinced that Congress did not intend that result.” 
 151. Id. at 474-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring: “[o]ne would have thought at least that the 
Court would have been led to consider how the specific purposes Congress identified for this 
legislation might shed light on the reasons for the change. Not only does the Court’s decision 
today give inadequate respect to the statute passed by Congress, it also gives inadequate 
deference to the GSA’s regulations interpreting FACA.” Id. at 477). 
 152. Croley & Funk, supra note 131, at 471. 
 153. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462; MED. ASSOC., supra note 5. 
 154. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 12-15. 
 155. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2) (2012). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(3) (2012). 
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and oversight.159 In order to initialize the regulation of these provisions, the 
physicians in Fischer relied on recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that 
groups utilized by federal agencies can become de facto FACs under the 
decision in Public Citizen.160 Further, the physicians in Fischer allege that de 
facto FACs are “those committees under the ‘actual management or 
control’ of a federal agency,”161 as well as “those committees utilized by a 
department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed 
advisory committee.”162 Thus, as CMS is charged with developing RVUs,163 
but ends up accepting a substantial majority of the RUC’s recommendations 
for those values,164 it is conceivable to align the RUC’s operation in tandem 
with CMS with the statutory interpretation of “utilization” under the FACA.165 
Regardless of the court’s refusal to address this issue166 and similar 
previous holdings,167 it appears that the RUC should indeed be governed by 
the FACA. In American Society of Dermatology v. Shalala,168 a similar case 
brought against CMS, the court found that CMS did not meet the standard 
of “actual management or control,”169 even though the court concluded 
that the RUC is “a limited number of private citizens who are brought 
together to give publicized advice as a group.”170 The physicians in Fischer 
disagreed and challenged the court to revisit this concept.171 The physicians 
in Fischer rely on both the language of Shalala, and another case, 
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 168. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. at 141. 
 169. Id. at 147. 
 170. Id. at 148. 
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Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton,172 which, 
among other conclusions, found that certain “working groups” upon which 
a governmental entity relied were FACs to the extent that they provided 
advice or recommendations on which the federal government relied. The 
court held: 
The point, it seems to us, is that a group is a FACA advisory committee 
when it is asked to render advice or recommendations, as a group, and not 
as a collection of individuals. The group’s activities are expected to, and 
appear to, benefit from the interaction among the members both internally 
and externally.173 
The physicians in Fischer rely directly upon this analysis in Clinton, asserting 
that CMS relies on data generated by the RUC, and that the RUC itself is “a 
formal group,”174 and not “a collection of individuals”175 which presents its 
findings to CMS.176 The court does not address this issue of reliance as a de 
facto advisement, thus ignoring the argument under the Clinton standard 
altogether, but instead, focuses solely on the statutory provision barring 
judicial review of value determinations and methodology.177 
The holding in Clinton is crucial to the physicians’ argument. In addition 
to the “working groups” holding, the Clinton court established a continuum 
for determining whether or not a particular group is subject to the FACA.178 
The court wrote: 
When we examine a particular group or committee to determine whether 
FACA applies, we must bear in mind that a range of variations exist in terms 
of the purpose, structure, and personnel of the group. Perhaps it is best 
characterized as a continuum. At one end one can visualize a formal group 
of a limited number of private citizens who are brought together to give 
publicized advice as a group. That model would seem covered by the statute 
regardless of other fortuities such as whether the members are called 
‘consultants.’ At the other end of the continuum is an unstructured 
arrangement in which the government seeks advice from what is only a 
collection of individuals who do not significantly interact with each other. 
That model, we think, does not trigger FACA.179 
 
 172. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir 1993); 
Am. Soc’y of Dermatology v. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. 141 (1996). 
 173. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 913 (emphasis added). See also Croley & Funk, supra note 
131, at 455. 
 174. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 915. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 52. 
 177. Fischer, 2012 WL 1655320, at *1-2. 
 178. Clinton, 997 F.2d at 915. 
 179. Id. at 915 (emphasis added). 
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The physicians in Fischer address this issue directly, claiming that the RUC is 
a “structured committee consisting of 26 voting members and a 
Chairperson who regularly meet and give their advice as a group to CMS,” 
thereby qualifying it under the structured end of the Clinton continuum.180 
Interestingly enough, the Fischer court ignored this rationale and paid no 
attention to the holding in Clinton, instead the court looked to American 
Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery v. Thompson.181 
The Thompson court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under 
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1)(B), holding that there is “strong presumption that 
Congress intends a judicial review of administrative action”182 and that “only 
upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative 
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”183 While it appears 
that this provision may in fact bar judicial or administrative review of CMS’s 
value determinations, it certainly does not preclude applicability of the FACA 
to the RUC, which was perhaps the intention of the physicians when they 
brought suit.184 If regulatory or legislative changes occur, such as removing 
the judiciability bar or subjecting the RUC to the FACA, the RUC could likely 
be found in violation of the FACA. 
Regrettably, it is nearly impossible to bring a private challenge under the 
FACA without first inducing the statutory immunity provision,185 which is 
likely the reason the physicians in Fischer sought to challenge the 
enforceability of the APA.186 For this, the physicians induced a ruling from a 
recent D.C. Circuit case, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of 
Commerce, which held that plaintiffs may bring FACA claims pursuant to the 
APA, thereby avoiding the private cause of action limitations for challenges 
under the FACA.187 
However, under the requirements laid out by the FACA and Clinton, the 
RUC is likely in violation of the FACA. Among the many challenges within 
the Fischer complaint, the physicians charged that the RUC was in violation 
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of several provisions within the FACA,188 including membership,189 
recommendations,190 public access,191 availability of committee records,192 
and oversight.193 
First, the RUC likely meets the standard alleged by the physicians in 
Fischer: the advisement practices of the RUC fall within the structured end of 
the spectrum described in Clinton194 and under the principle of utilization as 
described by Public Citizen.195 The RUC is, by its own admission, an expert 
panel comprised of 31 members who annually evaluate RVUs and prepare 
recommendations for CMS.196 The AMA concedes that CMS has adopted 
nearly 95% of the RUC’s PW recommendations, which are free to the 
federal government and cost the AMA, specialist societies, and other 
healthcare organizations up to $7 million per year in expenses, and boasts 
that “CMS could not replicate the resources to duplicate this process.”197 
Further, the AMA admits that “[t]he high acceptance rate is very important to 
the RUC [and that] [t]he RUC understands the boundaries within the RBRVS 
and abides by the definitions constructed by CMS.”198 It is confirmed by the 
AMA that “CMS has observers at each RUC meeting [and] [i]f a concern is 
expressed, the RUC responds accordingly.”199 The AMA also describes the 
RUC meetings as “deliberative discussion, often requiring in depth 
facilitation.”200 
Considering the significant amount of effort and determination required 
by the RUC in their recommendations, as well as the self-admitted claim by 
the AMA that CMS could not replicate this process without a significant cost 
to taxpayers, it is understandable that the RUC is utilized by CMS in the 
manner originally described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Public Citizen,201 
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especially in light of the Clinton decision.202 Here, the RUC operates 
extensively and solely for the purpose of making recommendations to CMS 
regarding the RBRVS.203 Further, the RUC was formed in conjunction with 
the establishment of the RBRVS in 1992,204 and has been relied upon by the 
CMS for over two decades.205 The best indicator that CMS is actually 
dependant on the RUC for its recommendations might be the fact that the 
RUC admits that CMS could not adequately replace the RUC without 
sustaining substantial expenses. Of course, the substantial adoption rate of 
recommendations206 cannot be ignored, especially if the process for 
determination is as in depth as the AMA proclaims.207 
Among the many issues with CMS’s reliance is the secrecy and 
imbalance by which the RUC operates; the exact problem sought to be 
eliminated under the FACA.208 Additionally, the FACA requires that a FAC 
must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented,”209 
which until recently, was a serious problem for the RUC.210 Further, of the 
RUC’s membership, only three of the 31 seats rotate while the other seats 
have no term limits, and 11 RUC members have been on the committee for 
at least eight years or more.211 The FACA also dictates that 
recommendations of a FAC cannot be “inappropriately influenced by the 
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appointing authority, in this case CMS, or by any special interest, but will 
instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.”212 
While the AMA’s official stance corresponds with this provision,213 the 
absence of a primary care representative from the committee for nearly 20 
years is alarming. Further, the data clearly shows that during the time of 
absence, the gap between specialist and primary care payments under the 
RBRVS widened.214 A failsafe of the FACA, and one of the driving policies 
behind its enactment, is the opportunity for public admittance to FAC 
meetings.215 The RUC, however, not subject to the FACA, does not invite the 
public to meetings, allow the public any input into the agenda meetings, nor 
does the public have any access to records, minutes, transcripts, or 
recordings of the meetings.216 Allegedly, only the RUC Chairperson may 
extend invitations to meetings.217 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Considering the RUC’s aforementioned style of operations against the 
provisions within the FACA, should a court decide it could review the RUC 
against the FACA, it would likely be in clear violation. What is unmistakable 
is the level of reliance by CMS upon the recommendations by the RUC, the 
widening physician-specialist payment gap, and the privacy by which the 
RUC operates. Legally, it can likely be concluded that the RUC is “utilized” 
by CMS at the requisite level to engage the provisions within the FACA as a 
de facto FAC. However, should imposition of the FACA upon the RUC prove 
tedious or complicated, and at this point there have been no successful 
legal challenges, several other options are available. The first option is the 
introduction of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), an 
independent, executive branch board created under the ACA, which has 
been afforded the task of reforming Medicare’s procedure-based 
reimbursement system.218 According to Ann Marie Marciarille and J. 
Bradford DeLong, the IPAB could offer more “coherent, technocratic, and 
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cost-effectiveness oriented logic” to the Medicare payment system,219 but 
others are much more skeptical.220 Much is still up for debate with the IPAB, 
as it has yet to receive a nomination for a single member.221 
Representative McDermott called for replacing the RUC, or at least 
supplementing it with a neutral third-party committee.222 In an attempt to 
neutralize the RUC of specialty favor, McDermott also introduced the 
Medicare Physician Payment Transparency and Assessment Act of 2011. 
Economist Uwe Reinhardt thanked the RUC for its tremendous work, but was 
quick to condemn CMS’s slavish adoption of value recommendations and 
calls for the task to be delegated instead to a “truly independent body.”223  
The evidence is overwhelming. Since the inception of the RBRVS and the 
RUC, physician payment discrepancies have not lessened, in fact, they have 
worsened,224 and it is due in part to the RUC’s secrecy. While the RUC has 
been under more scrutiny lately, with MedPAC proposals, congressional 
bills, and the physician lawsuit in Fischer v. Berwick, change appears to be 
imminent. The real question is when. 
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